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Abstract
This study explores the interaction between trade and geography in shaping the Islamic
economic doctrine and in turn the comparative development of the Muslim world. We build
a model where an unequal distribution of land quality in presence of trade opportunities
conferred di¤erential gains from trade across regions, fostering predatory behavior from the
poorly endowed ones. We show that in such an environment it was mutually benecial
to institute an economic system of income redistribution featuring direct income transfers
in return for safe passage to conduct trade. A commitment problem, however, rendered a
merely static redistribution system unsustainable. Islam added a set of dynamic redistrib-
utive rules that were self-enforcing under large gains from trade and high proportions of
arid land. While such principles fostered the expansion of trade within the Muslim world
they limited the accumulation of wealth by the commercial elite, shaping the economic
trajectory of Islamic lands in the preindustrial era.
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" For the protection of the Quraysh.
Their protection during their trading caravans in the winter and the summer.
So let them serve the Lord of this House.
Who feeds them against hunger and gives them security against fear."1
(Quran, 106: 1-4; MH Shakirs translation)2
1 Introduction
In the last years, the empirical growth literature has seen an increased interest in the relation-
ship between religion and politico-economic performance.3 Nevertheless, despite the promi-
nence of religion as a focal research topic across disciplines, its origins within economics are
poorly understood. Consequently, identifying the forces behind the formation of religious ad-
herence will greatly enhance our understanding of the phenomenon and its implications for
comparative economic development.
This study examines the economic origins of the Islamic doctrine and explores theo-
retically its implications for the process of comparative development in the Muslim world.
Motivated by the empirical ndings in our companion study, Michalopoulos, Naghavi, and
Prarolo (2012), that inequality in land productivity and trade possibilities are fundamental
determinants of contemporary Muslim adherence, we build a model where the interplay be-
tween these two forces dictates the redistributive nature of the Islamic economic principles and
explore its consequences for inequality and growth in the pre-industrial era.4
The link between the structure of production and institutional formation was early iden-
tied by Marx (1833 [1970]). According to Marx (1833 [1970]), religion is like any other social
institutions in that it is dependent upon the economic realities of a given society, i.e., it is an
outcome of its productive forces. Similarly, this study argues that since Islam emerged when
land dictated productive decisions, the Islamic institutional arrangement had to be compatible
with the conicting interests of groups living in regions characterized by an unequal distribu-
tion of agricultural endowments. Islamic principles were devised as a means of governing the
divergent interests of geographically unequal regions in the beginning of 7th century Arabia
at the critical juncture when trade routes were diverted over the peninsula. This is a prime
1Quraysh was the tribe dominating Meccan trade in the eve of Islam. Mohammad himself was member of
the Quraysh.
2Tahrike Tarsile Quran, Inc., (1983).
3See for example, Barro and McCleary (2003, 2006a, 2006b) , Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott (2013),
Chaney (2012), Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Pryor (2007), and Martin, Doppelhofer, and
Miller (2004).
4 It is important to note that the proposed theory is an attempt to rationalize the set of economic principles
embedded in the Islamic doctrine, remaining agnostic as to its theological underpinnings.
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example of how historical accidents, like the latter, may interact with geographical features to
lead to the emergence of a particular institutional framework, that of Islam. It is useful to note
that we do not argue that Islamic principles are the only rules that may emerge under unequal
geographic conditions in presence of trade opportunities. We do show nevertheless, that those
rules prescribed in the Islamic economic doctrine provide a solution to the conicting interests
caused by an unequal geography.5
In a stage of development when land determines productive capabilities, regional agri-
cultural suitability plays a fundamental role in shaping the potential of a region to produce a
surplus and thus engage in and prot from trade. Motivated by this observation, the theory
illustrates how an unequal distribution of land quality across regions may induce predation
from the less privileged territories instead of productive and mutually advantageous activities
(Olson, 2000). In particular, it suggests that inequality in agricultural productivity in presence
of trade opportunities conferred di¤erential gains from trade across regions, fostering preda-
tory behavior from the poorly endowed ones. In such an environment agriculturalists faced
the constant threat of predation from nomads when engaging in overland trade. The costly
nature of predation with roving bandits destroying surplus, created room for intervention and
redistribution, leading to concessions towards the dwellers of semiarid regions in exchange of
secure passage and access to the trade networks.
We show that a set of rules featuring only static income redistribution is not sustainable
due to commitment problems that arise in an intragenerational income transfer scheme, under-
mining the e¢ ciency of such agreements. On the contrary, arrangements incorporating elements
of dynamic intergenerational redistribution, where bequests no longer exclusively benet the
heirs of the rich, are more likely to be viable in the long-run. In the context of the proposed
theory, the Islamic doctrine distorted the relative returns to the factors of production against
wealth accumulation inducing a relatively less unequal di¤usion of wealth in the society over
time through channels such as investments in public goods by means of religious endowments.
We conjecture that the adoption of Islam over geographically unequal territories gave
such regions an early lead by facilitating trade. However, by discouraging the concentration of
wealth through redistributive rules, reduced the investment capabilities necessary for keeping
pace with the changing trading technologies. The resulting anemic commercial elite may have
contributed to the eventual decline of the Muslim lands vis-à-vis Western Europe.6 In sum, the
5Although a comparison between communism and Islamic economic principles is beyond the scope of the
study it is perhaps interesting to note that the common goal of narrowing income inequality was pursued via
very di¤erent means. Notably, Islam encouraged a market economy tolerating individual property rights while
limiting capital accumulation, whereas communism featured the opposite characteristics.
6This argument can also explain the inverse relationship between Islam and democracy (Huntington, 1993).
On the contrary, in the Western world the transatlantic trade gave rise to a powerful and wealthy commercial
class that also turned the political scene in its favor, limiting the rulers powers and contributing to the rise of
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Islamic economic principles that allowed the Muslim lands to escape from a state of constant
feuding and ourish in the preindustrial world, limited their potential for growth in the eve of
large scale shipping trade and capital-intensive industrialization (Chaudhuri, 1985).
Religion has been viewed as being both a cause and an outcome of economic development
with Weber (1905 [1930]) pioneering the independent role of Protestant ethics in fostering
economic progress. Such a feedback of religious a¢ liation to economic outcomes is also present
in our study where we show that the very adoption of the Muslim economic principles had both
long-run and short-run e¤ects on the economic performance of the Muslim lands. Becker and
Woessmann (2009) show in a recent study, however, that the signicant association between
Protestantism and economic prosperity across counties in late 19th-century Prussia may be
attributed to di¤erences in literacy between protestant and non-protestant regions. Along the
same lines, Botticini and Eckstein (2005, 2007) document how an exogenous change in the
Judaic religious doctrine in the 2nd century transformed the Jewish human capital towards
literacy providing them with a comparative advantage in urban, skilled occupations centuries
later. Finally, on the role of the economic environment in a¤ecting religious rules, Cervellati,
Jansen, and Sunde (2008) provide a theory where di¤erences in the religious norms regarding
charity versus self-responsibility, i.e., Catholicism versus Protestantism, depend on the relative
importance of luck versus e¤ort when individuals invest in human capital and face non-insurable
idiosyncratic income shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in detail the elements of
the Muslim economic doctrine and describes the role of trade and geography in the formation of
Islam including historical evidence from the Arabian peninsula. Section 3 presents the theory
and the results. Section 4 summarizes the key ndings and concludes.
2 Historical Background
The proposed theory rests upon two fundamental building blocks: (i) trade interests, particu-
larly salient in 7th century Arabia, were a major driving force in the formation of Islam and (ii)
inequality was a primal feature of the pre-Islamic Arabian economy which the Islamic economic
principles had to directly address.7
We argue that such conditions led to the emergence of a set of economic rules focusing
on (i) static income redistribution and poverty alleviation through arrangements known as ilaf
prior to- and zakat upon the advent- of Islam, and (ii) a dynamic redistribution system. The one
constitution and democracy.
7 In fact, in Michalopoulos, Naghavi, and Prarolo (2012) we show that the interaction between proximity to
trade routes and geographic inequality is not unique to the origins of Islam but is a key determinant of the
spatial distribution of contemporary Muslim societies across as well as within countries.
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introduced by the Islamic doctrine entailed explicit costs imposed on wealth accumulation via
the anti-riba laws, as well equitable inheritance laws and investments in public goods provision
through donations to religious endowments, the waqf.
2.1 The Origins
Arabia has a distinct geography with few places in Yemen, Bahrain, Central Arabia and several
scattered oases in the interior producing agricultural goods, such as frankincense, myrrh, vine,
dyes and dates in the eve of Islam. The rest of the peninsula features deserts and semi-
arid regions where nomadic life-style was the norm (Ibrahim, 1990). Across these infertile
swaths of land, tribes were directly involved in the collection of booty by conducting raids,
known as ghazw, on commercial caravans trading local produce as well as spices, gold, ivory,
pearls, precious stones, and textiles - arriving at the local ports from Africa, India, and the
Far East (Berkey, 2003). Scholars have argued that this distinctive geography shielded the
local populations from any form of urbanization allowing them to maintain their tribal culture,
preventing the formation of a unifying social structure (Haber and Menaldo, 2010). At the same
time, the infrequent urban commercial economies in a limited number of oases exacerbated
social and economic inequities between clans (Berkey, 2003).
In the pre-Islamic era, trade was maintained in the Peninsula as long as peripheral
kingdoms along the edges of Arabia, namely Himyarites, Ghassanids and Lakhmids, guarded
the routes and policed the Bedouin tribes. These kingdoms all disintegrated in the course of
the 6th century. As a result, political and commercial control over the Bedouin communities
could no longer be exerted and the Arabian economy got in decline (Lapidus, 2002). In parallel,
the Persian and Byzantine empires had been ghting a series of long and exhausting wars since
the start of the 6th century.
By the early 7th century the conicts had disrupted long-distance trade crossing the two
empires (Lewis, 1993). Piracy in the Red Sea was also on the rise due to the declining sea
power of the Byzantines (Winder, 2008). These events caused long-distance trade diversion
through the peninsula giving profound commercial value to overland trade routes in Arabia.
The resulting tra¢ c created new potential economic benets for the scattered oases. First, by
selling to the merchants they could take advantage of markets outside Arabia, and second, the
increased caravan tra¢ c was equivalent to higher demand for local produce.8
In order to materialize these benets through trade, they needed to maintain safe passage
for over a thousand miles of trails in an unsafe desert that crossed numerous tribal territories
(Bogle, 1998). As a result, caravans were constantly exposed to raids by the Bedouins, who
8Crone (2007) discusses the possibility that Meccans beneted directly from the Persian and Byzantine wars
supplying leather and hides to the Roman army.
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made up a considerable fraction of the population in the Arabian peninsula at that time (Berkey,
2003). This situation prompted early attempts to mitigate conict in pre-Islamic Arabia. For
example, in search for security the Meccan merchants o¤ered the arrangement of ilaf according
to which they would carry commodities produced by other tribes to be sold in markets and
fairs. In exchange, these tribes would provide security and protection (khafara) for Meccan
caravans passing through their territories. Also, within Mecca rich merchants were engaging
in alms provision to alleviate poverty. Such attempts, coupled with the formation of tribal
alliances, partially decreased tensions; nevertheless, these measures were short-lived since many
tribes were not bound by the institution of ilaf and alliances were constantly switching. These
elements produced a conictual environment featuring the merchants and oasis cultivators, on
one side, and the Bedouins, on the other. Ibrahim (1990) succinctly summarizes the economic
conditions prevailing in the eve of Islam: "An unequal distribution of wealth and resources
already existed in and around Mecca. This unequal distribution had the potential to disrupt
its network of alliances and trade routes".
It was in this cross-section of historical events that Muhammad was born. In Muham-
mads Arabia there was no government at any level. The Prophet formed his own state, and he
gave it a sacred law prescribed by Allah (Muller, 1958). The importance of trade in the forma-
tion of Islamic principles can hardly be underestimated.9 Muhammad himself was a Meccan
merchant, and the majority of those who contributed to the crystallization of the Muslim law
over time had a merchant or craftsman background (Cohen, 1970).10 To reach out to the het-
erogeneous Arabian tribes, a doctrine with a political base appealing to the divergent interest
groups was necessary. The Islamic economic principles were forged to align the clashing inter-
ests nurtured by the underlying unequal geography e¤ectively acting as a state-building force.
It o¤ered a means by which tribes could be unied through a common identity under one god
that transcended clan and class divisions (Stearns, Adas, Schwarz, and Gilbert, 2010). This
is in line with Iannaccone (1992) and Aimone, Iannaccone, Makowsky, and Rubin (2013), who
view religion as a club good showing how unproductive costs can overcome free-rider problems
associated with collective action. Levy and Razin (2012) further argue that religious organiza-
tions arise endogenously to foster social cooperation and social behavior by instilling beliefs on
the connection between rewards and punishments.
9See Bairoch (1988) for a discussion on how trade preceded urbanization in the Middle East.
10 In addition, Hodgson and Burke (1993) stress that the interests of merchants who wanted to gain access
to the widest possible network of trade routes coupled with the casteless and egalitarian message of Islam
contributed to its massive expansion.
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2.2 The Codes
In Islam, acts of charity are divided into voluntary (sadaqa) and obligatory (zakat). Zakat is
a religious obligation and is one of the Five Pillars of Islam.11 The Quran requires a believer
of su¢ cient economic means to give a fraction of her accumulated income for alms. Zakat
is allocated among the needy, the poor, those in debt, travelers, the zakat collector and for
slaves or captives. During the early history of Islam, zakat was collected and distributed by
the government appointed o¢ cials, in a centralized manner and it was e¤ective in alleviating
poverty. While zakat remained a main pillar of Islam, it lost signicance over time giving way
to other forms of redistribution. Indeed, its centralized collection was less frequently enforced
with time and adherence to it was left to the discretion of local authorities (Kuran, 2008b).12
A remarkable feature of the Islamic doctrine is the dynamic nature of redistribution.
Indeed, Islam features a host of detailed rules describing the limits imposed on the accumulation
of wealth. The role of inheritance laws and anti-usury laws are two characteristic examples.
Islamic law by recognizing only natural persons e¤ectively blocked the emergence of more
complex organizational forms such as corporations, restricting the mobilization and pooling
of resources. Regarding the inheritance laws Quran species that two-thirds of ones wealth
be allocated to various family members, including very distant relatives making it a rather
egalitarian distribution system (Kuran, 2008a). Equitable inheritance laws coupled with the
fact that more wealthy individuals were allowed to have more wives and consequently children,
was an additional force against the concentration of wealth and the increase in inequality. For a
thorough discussion on the economic principles of Islam, see Kuran (2004a). Also Kuran (2003)
argues that a by-product of such inheritance laws was an increase in the costs of dissolving a
business partnership following a partners death rendering business enterprises small, simple,
and generally ephemeral.
Perhaps, the most widely known Muslim economic principle is the prohibition against
riba, which most Muslim scholars have interpreted as interest(riba).13 Riba in the pre-Islamic
days was a system whereby the principle kept redoubling every time a borrower could not pay
it back. Such arrangement would frequently lead to the imprisonment or enslavement of the
borrower. As a result of the riba-ordinance of the Quran, Islam was formally committed to the
11For a discussion on how the doctrines of salvation and damnation provide di¤erent incentives for performing
economic activities and charitable deeds in Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, see McCleary (2007).
12Kuran (2001) notes that the third Caliph Uthman turned the obligation to pay zakat essentially into a tax
on agricultural output. Also, Jalili (2006) recognizes that although the tax systems di¤er considerably among
the Shiite and the four Sunni Schools (Malekite, Shafeite, Hanate and Hanbalite) they share common key
objectives with respect to alleviating poverty and improving income distribution.
13There was substantial controversy among early Muslims regarding the scope of this prohibition or even on
the denition of interest, see Rahman (1964) for a detailed discussion. Nevertheless, in the Islamic lands,
Christians and Jews who were not subject to this restriction, systematically engaged in money lending.
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eradication of interest in loan contracts. Kuran (2004b) argues that in practice, money lending
continued, however, uncertainty about the legitimacy of interest, combined with the lack of
corporate law, imposed signicant transactions costs on both lenders as well as borrowers.
One could use either of the principles described above to formalize the frictions on wealth
accumulation under Islam. In the context of the proposed theory we focus on the limitations
regarding interest bearing loans as well as on the formation of more e¢ cient organizational
forms.14 Such restrictions distorted the relative returns to the factors of production against
capital accumulation and in favor of public goods investments enhancing labor productivity. In
fact, the Quran declares that the opposite of riba is sadaqa which is spending to the benet of
people, that is, investing in assets enhancing the welfare of the community (Rahman, 1964). In
Islam the institution that emerged to allow for investing on such public functions was the waqf,
an inalienable endowment created by a person who granted land or other immovable property
in perpetuity for the advancement of a charitable or pious purpose, see Kuran (2001) for a
comprehensive account of the waqf system.
While zakat catered to the immediate needs of the poor, waqfs were voluntary and
enhanced the populations productive capacity through the provision of public goods such as
education, health care, and public utilities.15 Other examples of waqfs include mosques, free
accommodations for the poor, building and maintenance of water conduits and other public
services that would benet the community. The earliest waqfs appear in the rst decades of
Islam (Habib, 2004). Waqfs also contributed to the sedentarization of Arabs, i.e., transforming
some of the Bedouins from raiders to city dwellers (Bamyeh, 1999). Moreover, it has been
argued that in the newly-created Islamic urban hubs the common use of public facilities like
those funded by waqfs was the main source of interaction across di¤erent tribes leading to the
rise of Islamic identity.16 By the 18th and 19th century aggregate estimates on land waqfs reveal
their enormous economic standing. In Turkey three quarters of the countrys arable land, half
of the agricultural land in Algeria, one third in Tunisia and sizeable fractions in many other
Muslim countries were under waqf. Although similar estimates for assets other than land are
not available, it is known that the waqf system controlled a vast array of urban assets.17
14See Rubin (2009) for a comprehensive overview of interest bans in di¤erent religions.
15Shatzmiller (2001) stresses that "What conferred a unique historical signicance on the public waqf, was
the fact that for hundreds of years it provided the only regular nancial support for the medresa, a provider of
higher education". There are two types of waqfs the purely public ones and the family waqf. The key di¤erence
being that unlike the public one, whose services would be purely serving the community, in case of the family
waqf a fraction of wealth generated by the endowment would be directed to the family members of the donor or
the donor himself. Our theory focuses on the former.
16See Patel (2007) for an extensive discussion on the role of Islamic cities in developing an Islamic supra-
identity across tribes and the horizontal transmission of Islamic cultural norms among initially inward-oriented
Arab tribes through attendance in entities such as schools and central mosques.
17According to Kuran (2001), the Islamic waqf emerged as a result of volatile property rights, where religious
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Thus, unlike pre-Islamic local arrangements like ilaf and khafara, or even the zakat after
Islam, which was insu¢ cient by itself to settle ongoing conicts, Islam added a set of rules
that dictated inter-generational income redistribution providing a credible commitment to the
conicting parties. Other scholars have linked the success of Islamic expansion to its platform
of state formation, mediation among lineage groups and moral reform (Lapidus, 2002). For
example, Crone (1987) highlights that Islam was mainly o¤ering a programme of Arab state
formation and conquest. This is a complementary point of view that stresses the role of
conquests. We contribute to this line of thinking by showing that, in order to unite conicting
local interests among tribes in pre-Islamic Arabia, an appropriately crafted set of rules was
necessary.
It is perhaps interesting to note that Muhammads message was rst accepted in Medina
as a result of Medinas oasis cultivators facing increased conict from nomads in the periphery,
Aswad (1963), consistent with the proposed argument that Islamic economic principles were
forged to align these clashing interests nurtured by an underlying unequal geography. Never-
theless, we show that these principles though economically benecial in the short run impeded,
in the long run, a capital-intensive mode of production hindering development.
3 The Model
The theory illustrates (i) the conditions under which an unequal geography exposed to trade
opportunities leads to the adoption of the Islamic economic principles, and (ii) the long-run
consequences of the latter on the societys economic trajectory and growth. The crux of the
argument is that the appearance of trade routes exacerbated divergent economic opportunities
across fragmented patterns of fertile and arid land. To x ideas, consider two tribes, one living
in a fertile region, and the other in an arid one. The tribe in the fertile region could greatly
benet from trade by selling its output at higher prices, whereas the tribe in the arid region
could not. It is the juxtaposition of few fertile pockets of land surrounded by vast arid steppes
that causes the predatory behavior of the nomads when trade opportunities arise. To the extent
that the size of the arid region is large enough to signicantly threaten trade activities, we show
that a set of rules resembling the economic principles of Islam may emerge. As in Anderson and
Bandiera (2006) the interaction of predators and prey is crucial. A confrontation between the
trading caravan and the Bedouins taking place in the desert on the way to trade routes results
in a loss of cargo. The more desert to cross, the more vulnerable are tradersactivities, giving
geographic inequality a crucial role in determining the emergence of economic institutions.
endowments provided a credible commitment device to give property owners economic security in return for
social services and lower taxation. Also, by allowing the waqf donor to designate the manager of the waqf
granted him a way to circumvent the strict inheritance laws.
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Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which economic activity extends over
innite discrete time. In every period, each region produces a single homogeneous good using
e¤ective labor, capital, and land quality, which we consider as a technological parameter.
Regional output grows over time due to the accumulation of capital and e¤ective labor, while
land quality is exogenous and xed. The stock of capital in every period is the output produced
in the preceding period net of consumption and investment in public goods that enhance labor
productivity.
There are two equally-sized tribes, one living in each region. We assume agents cannot
migrate between regions since adapting to di¤erent ecologies requires the accumulation of very
di¤erent types of specic human capital (Chaney, 2012; Michalopoulos, 2012). In the MENA
region for example, people living in arid lands were predominantly nomadic, while those living
in fertile zones were mainly sedentary (Mikhail, 2012). Denoting Tr as the land quality in
region r where r = fP;Rg (Poor or Rich) and setting TR = 1, we can dene the relative land
quality as v = TRTP =
1
TP
> 1. Without loss of generality, the fertile regions (oasis) is surrounded
by a mass of desert 0 6  6 1. With the vector (v; ) we may characterize the economy-wide
land quality distribution whose geographical inequality is increasing in both arguments.
Agents may decide to sell their regional output at a foreign market if protable. The
domestic price is normalized to 1, whereas the availability of trade routes in the vicinity allows
access to the foreign market: p > 1. Thus, the appearance of trade routes, as in 7th century
Arabia, works as a positive price shock that may induce trade. Trade involves a xed cost
 < 1=2, needed to set up a caravan to reach the foreign markets.18 The more desert merchants
have to cross to reach trade routes (large ), the more they may lose from an organized ambush
by those who do not nd it protable to trade. Such roving bandits can challenge the traders
by incurring a cost equal to  < 1=2, where  can be expressed as the fraction of the booty
lost at the end of a raid. We refer to such confrontation between raiders and traders as conict
hereafter, the outcome of which is determined by the underlying geography of the area.
Within each period, the timing of the events can be summarized as follows: (1) agents
inherit e¤ective labor and/or private wealth from the previous generation; (2) production takes
place; (3) static or dynamic redistribution is o¤ered by the rich; (4) caravan sets o¤ to trade; (5)
the poor decide whether or not to attack the caravan; (6) trade/redistribution/raid outcomes
are realized; (7) consumption and bequests of wealth and/or investment in e¤ective labor take
place.
18We assume that it is prohibitively costly to engage in long-distance trade at an individual level. This is
consistent with the historical record, where long-distance trade expeditions were organized and implemented at
the community/tribal level.
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3.1 Production of Final Output
Production in each region displays constant-returns-to-scale with respect to the reproducible
factors of production. The output produced at time t in region r, is yr;t :
yr;t = Tr(1  )hr;t + kr;t; 2 (0; 1); r = fP;Rg:
where Tr is land quality in region r, hr;t and kr;t represent the regional e¤ective labor and the
amount of capital employed at period t in region r. Marginal product of e¤ective labor and
capital are equal to the wage rate per unit of e¤ective labor wr and the rate of return to capital
Rr respectively. With perfect substitutability, the producers inverse demand for factors of
production is:
wr = (1  )Tr
Rr = Tr;
(1)
that is constant over time in each region r. We assume that capital depreciates fully every
period and that
 >
1
2
; (C1)
implying that capital is relatively more productive than labor.
3.2 IndividualsWealth and Preferences
A representative agent from each tribe lives two periods. An adult at time t is an individual of
generation t. In the rst period, agents are economically idle. In the second period, they supply
inelastically their e¤ective labor hr;t in region r where they are born, earning the prevailing wage
rate wr. Moreover, they may receive capital bequests, sr;t 1; from their parents, generating an
income that is the return rate on capital Rr times the amount of bequests. Each agents gross
income is therefore:
Ir;t = wrhr;t +Rrsr;t 1; (2)
which can be consumed locally or traded abroad. Moreover, the rich can transfer a part of
their gross income to the poor in order to avoid the risk of being raided.
An individuals preferences are dened over consumption in the second period of his life,
cr;t, and potential gross income of his o¤spring, Ir;t+1. We assume that people consume up to
a satiation level ~c, after which they maximize utility on the basis of the gross income of their
child. Consider a utility function U(ct; It+1) dened as
U(ct; It+1) = ct + It+1; (3)
together with the constraint ct  ~c, where  < 1. As it will become apparent this utility
function is adopted to capture the spirit of Kaldorian-Keynesian savings behavior i.e., bequests
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and savings are an increasing function of wealth. Allowing for a more standard utility function,
like Ur;t =  ln cr;t+(1 ) ln Ir;t+1; would deliver qualitatively similar results. However, in this
case the adults income threshold of investing in childrens income (either through savings or
e¤ective labor enhancing investments) becomes endogenous to the anticipated factor returns,
making the analysis more cumbersome without adding further insights. More generally, the
qualitative predictions would go through as long as there are non-convexities in either the
production side or in the utility function producing an economic environment where inequality
increases over time.
3.3 Optimal Consumption and Transfers
Proceeding backward, in this section we look at the optimization problem of rich and poor
agents given their net income, Yr;t. Gross income Ir;t evolves into net income Yr;t through the
process of trade and conict, as described in Section 3.4 below.
3.3.1 Private Capital versus Public Good Bequests
E¤ective labor may accumulate over time through investments, er;t; in public goods that en-
hance labor productivity, i.e. waqfs. Unlike capital bequests that are individual specic, public
goods by nature provide benets across all regions of the economy. The following law of motion
describes how e¤ective labor evolves over time:
hr;t+1  ht+1 = 1 + (eR;t + eP;t); (4)
Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor in absence of any waqf investment and
0 <  < 1 captures the marginal benet of waqf.
It follows from (3) that an adult allocates her net income towards own consumption up to
the level of ~c, and devotes her remaining income to maximize the potential gross income of her
child in (2). In deciding how to best nance a childs gross income, an adult anticipates future
wage rates and capital returns and optimally splits bequests between private capital sr;t and
a waqf investment, er;t: Investment in capital delivers a marginal benet equal to Rr whereas
from (4) the marginal benet of investing in waqf is wR for a rich individual and wP for a
poor one. If net income is Yr;t  ~c; it is entirely spent on consumption, while if Yr;t > ~c, utility
(3) is maximized subject to budget constraint:
sr;t + er;t  Yr;t   ~c; (5)
where Yr;t   ~c is net income after consumption.
Now that we have dened the main building blocks and individualsoptimization struc-
ture, it is useful to dene the starting point of the economy:
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Denition 1 The initial condition of the model (at time t = 0) is one in which h0 = 1 and
sP; 1 = sR; 1 = 0, so that IP;0 = 1 v and IR;0 = 1  .
In order for trade opportunities to act as a trigger for capital accumulation, we assume
that in absence of trade, p = 1; no individuals leave bequests:
1   < ~c: (C2)
It follows that without trade and under (C2) regional incomes remain constant. Moreover,
throughout the analysis we assume that the tribe in the agriculturally poor region is initially
unable to engage in trade, i.e.
IP;0 < ; (C3)
and this is always true for large enough values of v. Condition (C3) implies that if v ! 1
the poor region is indistinguishable from the rich one because their productivities coincide and
they would behave similarly in terms of production, trade, and bequests. Moreover, looking
at (1), (2) and (4), v ! 1 gives IP;0 ! 0. Hence, we consider small enough values of land
productivity, TP ; such that the emergence of trade opportunities creates conicting interests
between regions.
Finally, let us dene a minimum price obtained by trading abroad,
p  ~c
(1    ) ; (C4)
which is achievable once commercial trade routes emerge in the vicinity. In what follows, we
characterize the optimal behavior of agents in the rich region given conditions (C1), (C2), (C3)
and (C4). Note that in absence of income transfers agents in the poor region cannot reach
satiation point ~c, and hence do not leave bequests. Thus, in the rest of this section we only
refer to the bequeathing behavior of the rich.
3.3.2 Anti-Riba Regulation and Investment in Public waqf
Kuran (2008a) argues that anti-riba laws for the Muslims were equivalent to increasing transac-
tions costs, which limited the return on wealth accumulation for Muslim adherents. The lower
return on private investment implied by the anti-riba law induced the agents to switch to pub-
lic labor-enhancing investments. We model such restrictions as follows. Dene the net return
on capital investments as RNR = RR, where  2 [0; 1] is an inverse measure of the distortion
in the marginal product of capital induced by the limitations on contracts involving capital
investments. The comparison between the two forms of investment boils down to evaluating
the returns from private capital bequests versus public good investments, i.e., RR 7 wR.
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Returns to factors of production are independent of the quantity of factors employed, so
individuals from fertile regions prefer public good investments over capital savings as long as:
  1  

  R
Below we study the bequest behavior of parents as a function of the riba regime in which
they live, i.e. with or without restrictions on capital investments. When there are no distortions
on capital accumulation,  = 1; rich only bequeath capital when bequests are positive:
sR;t(YR;t) =
(
0 if YR;t  ~c
YR;t   ~c if YR;t > ~c
: (6)
When restrictions are signicant, i.e. riba is not allowed,   R; the rich invest in public
goods. In this case optimal labor enhancing investment becomes:
eR;t(YR;t) =
(
0 if YR;t  ~c
YR;t   ~c if YR;t > ~c
: (7)
Note that because of (4) the poor benet from the waqf investment made by the rich.19
3.4 Trade, Conict, and Redistribution
In absence of bequests, foreign prices p and the level of land quality determine the ability to
engage in trade. Generally, a region trades if and only if Ir;t < p(Ir;t   )() Ir;t > pp 1 when
there is no risk of conict. In this section, we discuss the initial stage of the economy at t = 0
as dened above.
3.4.1 Trade and the Threat of a Raid
When trade becomes a viable option only the tribe in the fertile region may participate. Given
condition (C3), the tribe in the poor region cannot overcome the xed trading cost, . Never-
theless, it may raid the caravan of the trading region and obtain part of the goods if protable.
These decisions are considered to be collective actions as tribalism or asabiyya (the clan spirit)
obliged each tribe to protect its fellow members (Watt, 1961). The outcome of the confrontation
depends on the ghting strength of each side, determined by a retention function fr() 2 [0; 1]
whose argument is the size of the poorly endowed region . The function fr() is continuous
and di¤erentiable. Without loss of generality we focus on the retention rate of the rich region,
i.e., fR() = 1   fP (), where fR(1) = 0, fR(0) = 1, @fR()@ < 0 and @fP ()@ > 0. Note that
introducing a Malthusian environment with endogenous fertility would imply that regions with
19Given our utility function, there are no free riding incentives. Given  < R once c = ~c is attained, the
only way to increase utility is to leave bequests. Moreover, allowing the waqf donors to partially internalize the
return on waqfs would not change the qualitative predictions.
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better land quality are more densely populated (Ashraf and Galor, 2011), weakening the po-
tency of predation by the poor. Properties of fr() emphasize the fact that overland trade is
space intensive, so that the higher is the proportion of arid lands, , the larger is the predation
threat to any caravan on the way to trade routes. In other words, the importance of relative
population densities in determining the conict outcome diminishes when the latter takes place
out in the desert.
We model the trade and raid process as a sequence, where the rich evaluate the prof-
itability of trade conditional on the decision of the poor whether or not to raid.20 It follows
from (3), (6), and (7) that utility is increasing in net income. At any time t, the rich tribe
would trade if its post-conict net income Y cR;t exceeds the income under no trade, IR;t:
IR;t < Y
c
R;t  p(IR;t   )fR();
which in period 0 can be rewritten as
fR()  1  
p(1    ) > 0: (8)
The inequality shows that trade is more likely to occur as the ability of the rich to retain goods
during a raid increases (larger fR()), and gains from trade are large (a higher gross income
1  , higher prices p, or lower trade costs ).
Lemma 1 There exists a unique threshold of poor regions size  2 (0; 1) giving fR() =
1 
p(1  ) , so that trade in the presence of conict is only protable for  < .
P roof. Since fR() is continuous, monotonically decreasing in , fR(0) = 1 and fR(1) =
0, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem and (8) that there exists a unique level of
poor regions size  such that fR() = 1 p(1  )  fR. Hence there exists a    such that if
 <  then fR() > fR and the rich trade, whereas if  >  then fR() 6 fR and they only
consume locally.
The tribe in the poor region may plunder the goods being traded. In line with the
historical evidence, we assume a raid may occur when a caravan is on its way to the trade
routes.21 There is a cost of conict for the poor that represents resources lost during an
ambush. In particular, they sustain a loss equivalent to a fraction  of any booty they seize
20We abstract from partial coalition formation, i.e., the rich bribing some of the poor into power-sharing, thus
limiting the strength of the remaining poor to a su¢ ciently low level. Such practise did take place between the
fall of the Roman Empire and the rise of Islam, between merchant clans and bedouin tribes. However, most of
them were short-lived and coalitions were constantly switching precipitating the emergence of Islam, see Ibrahim
(1990).
21Note that as the poor cannot overcome the costs of setting up a caravan, we assume away the possibility of
trading goods collected during a raid.
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at the end of the conict. Thus, raiding is only a credible threat if what the poor can obtain
exceeds the income of remaining passive and consuming own production, i.e.,:
IP;t < IP;t + (IR;t   )[fP ()  ]; (9)
which can be rewritten as
fP ()   > 0: (10)
The inequality shows that the poor would only raid if the share of goods they obtain is large
enough to overcome the costs of conict .
Lemma 2 There exists a unique threshold of poor regions size  2 (0; ) giving fP () = , so
that a raid is only a credible threat for  >  > .
P roof. Note that fP () is continuous and monotonically increasing in , fP (0) = 0
and fP () = 1  1 p(1  ) . As long as p > 1 (1  )(1 ) =) fP () > , which holds from (C2),
(C4) and  < 1=2, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists a unique
level of poor regions size  2  0;  such that fP () =   fP . Hence, there exists a   
such that if  >  then fP () > fP and the poor raid, whereas if  6  then fP () 6 fP and
there is no conict.
3.4.2 The Static Redistribution System
We now introduce the possibility of static, that is same period, income redistribution, zakat,
and investigate the necessary conditions under which a zakat contract is mutually benecial
and whether can be an equilibrium outcome. The zakat contract takes the form of a fraction z
of richs income that is transferred to the poor. We assume that zakat once agreed upon is paid
prior to trade. The poor would prefer a zakat payment as a form of compensation to refrain
from conict if the transfer is larger than what they would gain from a raid:
IP;t + z(IR;t   )  IP;t + [(fP ()  ](IR;t   ):
This gives a minimum acceptable zakat rate, z; of
z  z() = maxf0; fP ()  g; (11)
which is weakly increasing in fP (), thus weakly increasing in  and weakly decreasing in .
Note that z only becomes positive at fP , which looking at (10) occurs at the exact level of poor
regions size , that is when the poor nd it optimal to raid.
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The maximum zakat rate the rich would be willing to pay can be found by comparing
their post-trade income under conict with that under a zakat regime:
p(1  z)(IR;t   )  fR()p(IR;t   );
which gives
z  z() = fP ()  1: (12)
and is increasing in . Note that conict occurs only when fP () > fP : Below this threshold
there is no conict so the maximum zakat rate of the rich is 0. It is easy to see from (11)
and (12) that z < z always holds, thus there exists a positive zakat rate that delivers a Pareto
preferred outcome as long as  > .
Given the structure of trade and redistribution, we can now dene the net income of the
rich as:
YR;t =
p (IR;t   ) no conict
fR()p (IR;t   ) conict
(1  z)p (IR;t   ) zakat
(1  z)fR()p (IR;t   ) zakat and conict.
(13)
The net income of the poor is equal to their gross income, plus zakat earnings, with the
latter being equivalent to their potential gains from conict:
YP;t = IP;t + z (IR;t   ) : (14)
If the poor deviate by raiding after receiving the transfer payment, they can achieve a net
income of
YP;t = IP;t + [z + (1  z)(fP ()  )] (IR;t   ) : (15)
Although adopting a static redistribution system is Pareto e¢ cient, it is not guaranteed
that it is a Nash equilibrium because the poor may deviate and attack the caravan after having
received the transfer. In fact, the pre-Islamic redistribution attempts between tribes in Arabian
peninsula (ilaf ) could be thought of as an unstable equivalent to the Islamic institution. This is
straightforward to see in Figure 1 that illustrates the outcome of the game between the rich and
the poor in terms of their net income. The dominant strategy for the rich is to not redistribute
their wealth and for the poor to raid, giving rise to a Prisoners Dilemma problem. A static
redistribution system hence fails to deliver a sustainable solution that safeguards trade as the
nomadic clan always nds it optimal to raid the caravan after receiving the redistribution.
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Figure 1: The Failure of a Static Redistribution System
Lemma 3 Using (11) and (12), a zero zakat rate obtains for   , while for  >  there
exists a positive zakat rate of z increasing in , which is benecial for both sides. Commitment
problems, however, impede the Pareto e¢ cient solution rendering a static redistribution system
as such ine¤ective.
P roof. Follows by directly comparing (11) to (12), the properties of fP (), and the
properties of the Nash equilibrium in Figure 1.
3.5 Geography and the Emergence of Islamic Economic Principles
We now turn to conditions that give rise to the emergence of Islam as an endogenous insti-
tution. We refer to Islam as a contract that besides the static transfer (which was shown to
be unsustainable), adds a dynamic layer of redistribution. This can be modelled as any force
that spreads wealth and avoids its concentration such as a partible inheritance system, or a
combination of regulations that limit wealth accumulation and induce public good investments
by the rich, i.e., waqf. In the latter case, benets to the next generation in terms of higher
labor productivity are also enjoyed by the poorer clan.
Starting with the initial condition at t = 0, an Islamic pact is o¤ered and must be
accepted by both sides to go through. Figure 2 displays a redistribution scheme that exhibits
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Figure 2: Islam as a System of Dynamic Redistribution
both static and dynamic aspects. The introduction of the latter acts as a coordination device
by eliminating the commitment problem present in a system of static redistribution only. This
line of reasoning can be illustrated by a game, where the rich adopt Islam if protable, and the
poor follow and decide whether to abide by the doctrine or resort to predation.
The nomadic clan uses the threat of conict to establish Islam with its bargaining power
increasing in . To see whether or not an Islamic-like set of rules goes through one may compare
the utility of the rich clan with and without Islam. The latter calculate their utility under Islam
U R with both zakat and anti-riba in place and compare it to their outside option U
c
R, which
is conict for all  > . At time t = 0, the level of net income under conict Y cR that gives
Y cR = ~c, above which the rich leave capital bequests, solves
fR()  ~c
p(1    ) > 0: (16)
With equality, (16) gives   ~c0 so that capital bequests are positive if  < ~c0 and zero
otherwise. In addition, looking at (8) and (16) along with (C2) and (C4) assures that  < ~c0 <
. Bequests are more likely to be positive when fR(), 1   , and p are larger, and for lower
trade costs .
Lemma 4 Under conict there exists a unique threshold of poor regions size ~c0 2
 
; 

giving
fR(~
c
0) =
~c
p(1  ) so that capital bequests are positive only for  < ~
c
0.
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P roof. Note that fR() is continuous, fR() = 1    and fR() = 1 p(1  ) . Given
(C2), (6), (8), (13) and (16), as long as p > ~c(1  )(1 ) =) fR(~c0) > 1   , which holds
from (C4) and  < 1=2, it follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem that there exists a
share of poor regions ~c0 2
 
; 

such that fR(~c0) =
~c
p(1  )  ~f cR;0. Also, since fR() is
monotonically decreasing in , this ~c0 is unique. So, if  < ~
c
0 then fR() > ~f
c
R;0 and capital
savings by the rich are positive, whereas if  > ~c0 then fR() 6 ~f cR;0 and savings are zero.
Similarly, one may derive the threshold  below which investments are positive under an
Islamic contract, by solving for the net income under Islam, Y R, that guarantees consumption
equal to ~c: The only di¤erence from the previous case is the additional gain from avoiding
conict. The following inequality solves for ~0 below which bequests under Islam are positive:
fR()  ~c
p(1    ) +  > 0: (17)
Substituting for p from (C4), one can show that (17) always holds, hence waqf bequests by
the rich are always positive under Islam. Note that while Y cR > ~c no longer holds for  > ~c0,
Y R > ~c still obtains due to the extra term .
The poor under no Islam always nd it optimal to raid as in the static redistribution
case. In contrast, under Islam, which includes zakat and a waqf -inducing anti-riba regime,
they are strictly better o¤ to comply when gains from trade are large. Given the su¢ cient
condition for the rich to adopt Islam,  > ~c0, from Lemma 4, should the poor choose to raid
after the Islamic contract is o¤ered neither side can enjoy the benets of waqf as no wealth
remains to be bequeathed. Indeed, since the rich get raided and pay zakat in this case, the
zero bequest threshold is reached at a lower level of  than ~c0. Raiding is therefore no longer
incentive compatible for the poor under the structure o¤ered by Islam. This leaves a choice
between the static benets of a raid versus the dynamic gains from Islam:
Lemma 5 When gain from trades are large (p > p > p), the utility of the poor under Islam is
greater than the one-time benets from a raid obtained upon deviation from the principles, i.e.
U P > U
c
P .
P roof. The utility of the poor in case they accept Islam o¤ered by the rich or forego
the benets and raid are depicted on the left branch of the tree in Figure 2. Islam is strictly
preferred by the poor if and only if the dynamic gains outweigh a one-time raid such that
U P > U
c
P ) 1 v (p(1   z)(1      )   ~c) > (1   z)(fP ()   )(1      ) at time t = 0,
where zakat earnings appear on both sides and therefore cancel out. This condition reduces
to p > ~c(1  ) +
fP () 
1 
v

= p + fP () 1 
v

 p, where we have used 1   z = fR() +  in the
denominator of the rst term on the RHS and replaced fR() = 0 to depict the minimum value
it can take.
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Lemma 5 shows that under large gains from trade the poor respond positively to the
adoption of Islam by the rich, i.e., they unify to join the Islamic community. Focusing on
t = 0, it is straightforward to show that Islam is accepted by both sides for all  > ~c0 where
the alternative is no bequests. In this range, the only option for the rich to leave benets to
the next generation is to switch to Islam and public goods investments as opposed to capital
bequests. Islam also brings static gains by preventing conict. The di¤erence between what a
rich is willing to pay to avoid conict and what he actually pays, i.e. the di¤erence between
z and z in (11) and (12), is the economic value added by Islam and amounts to . On the
dynamic side, the poor also gain by assuring bequests to their o¤springs, which outweigh static
gains from a raid under large gains from trade.
One may therefore state:
Proposition 1 When the mass of the arid lands and gains from trade are substantial such
that  > ~c0 and p > p, an Islamic contract is agreed upon by the rich clan and respected by the
nomadic one at t = 0.
P roof. Follows directly from Lemmas 4 and 5. For large enough values of p that
make dynamic gains from Islam more attractive than a one-time raid for the poor,  > ~c0 is a
su¢ cient condition for Islam to be accepted as an institution because (i) the rich will have a
static gain by avoiding a raid, (ii) the rich will have dynamic benets as opposed to no capital
bequests, (iii) the poor obtain higher dynamic gains from waqf than raiding and the latter
leaves no wealth by the rich to be invested in waqf.
Looking back at Figure 2, Islam is proposed for all  > ~c0, where the rich prefer waqf to
individual accumulation of wealth under conict and the poor consequently respect the system
and refrain from raids to receive the long-run benets of Islam as opposed to the one time gain
from a raid.
In summary, when there are few arid regions to cross, i.e., for  < , there is no material
threat of a raid and no redistributive institutions emerge. However, when they account for a
moderate part of the geography, i.e.,  <  < ~c0; the rich may prefer to accumulate and the
poor therefore continue to raid. This is an economy where static redistribution collapses due
to commitment problems. Finally, as long as the mass of arid lands is large enough, the rich
accept Islam because the threat of conict is e¤ective and potential losses are high. Islam is
accepted for  > ~c0 because the rich will otherwise not be able to leave any bequests under
conict, or even trade for  > . As a consequence, once trade becomes feasible in period
t = 0, Islam is founded for  > ~c0, the rich pay zakat, and leave bequests in the form of public
waqfs.
20
In what follows we explore the dynamics to establish the conditions under which the
Islamic economic principles, once adopted, also persist in the long run. In other words, we
examine whether there exists a steady state threshold value of poor regions size ~cS < 1,
above which the Islamic equilibrium obtains. Moreover, we present some results related to the
dynamic behavior of economies characterized by di¤erent regimes and analyze the steady state
levels of income and inequality under di¤erent initial conditions.
3.6 Persistence of the Islamic Doctrine and the Long-term Evolution of
Income
In presence of regional gains from trade and large inequality in land productivity, the presence
of vast arid lands is a fundamental determinant of the emergence of the Islamic institution. We
now conduct a dynamic analysis to study the persistence of Islam and the long-run evolution
of the economy. In doing so, we derive the steady state income of the rich and the poor region
in each case and observe ex-post the conditions under which Islam persists. The analysis also
allows to track the dynamics of inequality in the presence and in absence of Islam.
A full Islamic contract comprises an anti-riba law together with a zakat transfer from the
rich to the poor. We know from Proposition 1 that an Islamic institution is initially founded if
 > ~c0. The anti-riba law sways the rich to divert bequests from private capital to public good
investments that enhance labor productivity of all agents. Note that due to the public nature
of waqf, inequality under Islam does not change along the process of development. However,
the bequest and the Islam thresholds, referred to as ~ct  ~ct(IR;t) henceforth, may change due
to IR;t increasing over time.
Corollary 1 At any period t, the expression fR(~c0) derived in Lemma 4 is generalized to
fR(~
c
t) =
~c
p(IR;t ) . Since
@fR(~
c
t )
@IR;t
< 0, it follows that the threshold value ~ct rises over time as
IR;t increases. Intuitively, a larger gross income eases the constraint to leave bequests for the
rich in presence of conict and discourages the persistence of Islam.
P roof. Substituting the gross income in period 0, (1   ), with the gross income in
period t; IR;t; in the RHS of fR(~c0) in Lemma 4, the expression becomes fR(~
c
t) =
~c
p(IR;t ) .
Further, @
~ct
@IR;t
> 0 follows by directly inspecting the expression in the Corollary and using the
properties of fR().
Given Corollary 1, as long as (i)   ~ct , (ii) IR;tv <  and (iii) YP;t < ~c so that the poor
cannot engage in trade or leave bequests at all t, Islamic rules are accepted in every period.
Note that (i) follows from Proposition 1 and (ii) and (iii) generalize conditions (C2) and (C3). If
conditions (ii) or (iii) fail at any time t, the poor get enough income to trade or leave bequests,
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respectively. In this case, the need to adhere to the Islamic principles diminishes even if initially
adopted.
The economy evolves according to the dynamic equations8<:
IR;t+1 = (1  )(1 + [(1  z)p(IR;t   )  ~c])
IP;t+1 =
IR;t+1
v
(18)
where we have used equations (7), (11), (13) and (14). Note that income inequality is constant
and equal to v along the process of development. Gross income of the rich increases in every
period and eventually monotonically reaches the steady state level:
IR;S = (1  )

1 + 
p (1    ) (1  z)  ~c
1  p (1  ) (1  z)

(19)
if p < 1=[(1  ) (1  z)]. It is easy to see that this su¢ cient condition ensures that both the
denominator in the parenthesis in (19) is positive guaranteeing a positive steady state income
level, and the slope of the linear function IR;t+1 is between 0 and 1. A rst-order linear dynamic
equation with such features delivers a stable steady state with monotonic convergence. The
steady state gross income is the wage rate times the steady state level of investment in public
goods. It is positive and larger than initial gross income (1 ) from (C4). The gross income of
the poor also increases under Islam because of the enhanced labor productivity arising through
waqf investments. Poors income is at its maximum level in the steady state with IP;S =
IR;S
v .
If the price condition above is not satised, growth of income of both the rich and the poor
is unbounded, (ii) or (iii) will eventually fail to hold, and the importance of implementing the
Islamic economic principles declines in the long-run.
Corollary 1 shows that the Islamic contract may be abandoned as the gross income of
the rich increases. However, using (19) one may show that there exists a threshold mass of the
poor lands, ~cS , above which the rich remain loyal to Islam in the long run.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique threshold ~cS 2 (~c0; 1), where Islam is adopted both in
the short and in the long-run for 8  > ~cS.
P roof. To check for the existence and uniqueness of ~cS < 1, rst substitute  = 1
into expression fR(~ct) in Lemma 4, yielding
~c
p(1  ) . From (C2) and (8) we know that
fR(1) <
~c
p(1  ) , so that in the limit case of ! 1 the rich would prefer the Islamic contract.
Next, Corollary 1 shows that ~ct is increasing with time. It follows from the Intermediate Value
Theorem that there exist a unique ~cS > ~
c
0 such that if  > ~
c
S then Islam persists in the long
run, whereas if  < ~cS then Islam may get abandoned after being adopted in t = 0.
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Figure 3: Land Quality and Islamic Institutions
Proposition 2 establishes the existence of an interval, in which Islam is sustainable in
the long run. We can conclude that Islam is initially founded and may be abandoned in the
long run for ~c0 6  < ~cS , while it is founded and persists for ~cS 6  < 1. If the contract is
abandoned, the economy ultimately evolves back into a no institution case. Figure 3 presents
the main results of the two propositions on the critical values of  that determine the adoption
and persistence of the Islamic institutions parallel to those the decide the behavior of the society
regarding trade, raids and bequests.
In economies where the share of the poorly endowed territories is such that  < ~cS ,
institutions either do not emerge or may not persist and regions evolve along di¤erent economic
trajectories. Assuming for simplicity that only the rich can engage in trade, the gross income
of rich and poor follow the dynamics described by:(
IR;t+1 = (1  ) + [fR()p(IR;t   )  ~c]
IP;t+1 = IP;0 =
(1 )
v
(20)
where we have used condition (C3) and equations (5), (6), (13) and (14). Gross income of the
poor remains constant whereas that of the rich increases every period due to condition (C4)
and in the long run either explodes along with inequality or reaches the steady state level
IR;S = (1  ) + 

fR()p(1    )  ~c
1  fR()p

; (21)
for p < 1fR() , where fR() = 1 for  6 . This may be decomposed into the labor income (rst
term) plus the returns on capital times the steady state level of capital bequests. Comparing
(19) to (21) reveals that the income of the rich region, even under the steady state, is always
lower under Islam because of (i) lower return from public good investments and the dilution
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of waqf benets and (ii) the fraction of gross income transferred to the poor due to a positive
zakat rate z.
Proposition 3 While the Islamic doctrine was suitable to mitigate income inequality in the
society, it hampered economic development by limiting private investments and wealth accumu-
lation, thereby constraining long-run growth of income.
P roof. Follows directly from equations (18)-(21).
To summarize, in absence of Islamic rules territories characterized by a large share of
poorly endowed areas would be trapped in a state of eternal feuding. So, while the emergence
of Islam allowed these economies to escape a conict trap and ourish in the preindustrial
world, these very institutions resulted in negligible capital accumulation shaping the economic
trajectory of the Islamic lands. These ndings complement Galor and Tsiddon (1997), who
show that polarization of income in early stages of development serves as a necessary ingredient
to future economic growth and that prematurely implementing policies designed to reduce
inequality leads to stagnation in the long-run. Similarly, Galor and Moav (2004) argue that
income inequality in the early stages of development is growth promoting since it leads to
wealth being channeled towards those with higher propensity to save, fueling the accumulation
of capital. In the context of the proposed theory, Islamic economic doctrine in pursuit of keeping
an already unequal income distribution within bounds, engineered principles that channeled
preindustrial wealth towards public good investments in the form of religious endowments.
4 Conclusion
This research sheds new light on the economic origins and consequences of the Muslim economic
doctrine. The theory provided links the emergence of trade opportunities across geographically
unequal territories to the formation of the Islamic principles and investigates how the adoption
of the latter shaped the economic performance of the Muslim world in the preindustrial era.
We have sketched a simple model that shows how geographic inequality when exposed
to trade opportunities leads to the emergence of dynamic redistributive institutions similar to
those prescribed by the Islamic doctrine. In the context of the model the following elements
are crucial. First, substantive gains from trade. Second, the size of the region that cannot
benet from trade is important in determining the institutional setup. If poorly-endowed terri-
tories constitute a small fraction of the landscape no redistributive institutions arise, while for
intermediate values, only static redistribution is feasible but unsustainable due to commitment
problems. However, once their size crosses a certain threshold, the threat for the rich to be
raided increases to the point that they are willing to adopt the Islamic contract. The results
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are consistent with our companion paper, Michalopoulos, Naghavi, and Prarolo (2012), where
we nd that the interaction between distance to pre-industrial trade routes and geographic
inequality is a key predictor of the distribution of Muslim communities in the Old world.
We argue that geography and trade opportunities forged the Islamic economic doctrine
inuencing the process of historical development of the Islamic lands. In particular, the unequal
distribution of land endowments conferred di¤erential gains from trade across regions, fostering
predatory behavior from the poorly endowed ones. In such an environment, it was mutually
benecial to institute an economic system dictating income redistribution. A static transfer
of income only, however, was unsustainable due to commitment problems undermining the
viability of trade. Islam o¤ered principles that provided a dynamic redistribution system
tailored to limit the accumulation of wealth across highly unequal regions. Examples of dynamic
redistribution that kept wealth inequality within limits include the partible inheritance rules,
the frictions on borrowing and lending and the concomitant emphasis on public goods provision
via religious endowments. As a result of these principles the Muslim lands managed to escape
a state of constant feuding and ourish in the preindustrial world limiting, however, the wealth
accumulation for the commercial elite and hence the potential for growth in the era of large-scale
shipping trade and industrialization.
Finally, it is worth noting that Christianity also emerged in current day Israel and Pales-
tine which feature a prominently unequal distribution of land endowments. Despite these
common geographical origins, which may explain the similarities in the economic doctrine be-
tween Christianity and Islam, the former eventually spread in Europe modifying over time its
doctrine. For example, although Christianity did enforce rigorously the prohibition on interest
in the beginning, gradually and particularly with the Protestant Reformation enforcement of
laws against usury were relaxed (Rubin, 2011).22 The di¤erent path of development experienced
by the Christian world can also be associated with inheritance laws, which in several instances
preserved economic inequality and encouraged the accumulation of capital (Bertocchi, 2006)
22 In fact, by the beginning of the 17th century usury was downgraded from an o¤ence against public morality
to a private conscience issue, Visser and Macintosh (1998). Also, during the Amoraic period in Babylonia
(200AD to 500AD) interest rate started being accepted by the Jewish community.
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